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The Great Recession started in 2008 has induced a desperate crisis management procedure 
among the member states of the EU. Without sufficient common budget and legitimate 
common crisis management strategy, member states had to pply their own set of measures 
to moderate the economic and social effects of the crisis. Most member states suffered a W-
shaped crisis, with a recession in 2008-2009, followed by a short period of stagnation or 
modest growth in 2010, and then in 2011, a second, more severe and prolonged relapse got 
started. Accordingly, the general phases of crisis management can be defined: firstly, anti-
cyclical measures were dominant to restore the declining demand while, when the sovereign 
debt crisis burst out, restrictive policies and austerity became dominant. 
The purpose of restrictive policies has been to resto  confidence on the markets by 
setting a sustainable and credible government budget. It can be realized by increase of tax 
revenues or cuttings in government spending; althoug  the first choice seems to be easier to 
realize, cuts in government spendings or the combinatio  of both appears more effective. 
Moreover, balance-improving measures are often futile if not accompanied by adequate 
structural reforms. Austerity policies are frequently criticized because they strangle 
economic growth and disregard social sacrifices like unemployment or income inequalities. 
However, in times of such hectic trends in sovereign markets, for member states with massive 
levels of public debt austerity does not have a real alternative. 
In our study, we aim to apply statistical analysis on austerity measures. As previous 
research suggests, too much austerity can be proven harmful for economic growth and 
impedes reaching pre-crisis levels of income. Our hypothesis is that member states applying 
the largest austerity packages recover more slowly than those applying moderate austerity. 
We collected our data from the AMECO database to examine the change in austerity 
measures and in recovery from the crisis for the EU-27 member states. We used variables 
such as the governments’ total expenditures or social benefits to estimate the austerity 
measures; and the recovery from crisis was measured, among others, by the unemployment 
rate or by the gap between the actual and potential GDP. In our methodology, we examined 
the relations between austerity measures and recovery from crisis variables with the help of 
graphical and correlation analysis. Our study confirms our hypothesis and reveals 
additional information about fiscal consolidation. 
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After Europe’s mostly prosperous decade, the Great Recession started in 2008 
brought numerous years of recession in the economy of the European Union. Real 
gross domestic product of the EU-27 fell by 4.5% in 2009 and, although the general 
economic climate ameliorated in 2010-2011, the 2013 GDP at constant prices was 
still almost 1 percentage point below the 2007 level (AMECO 2014). Some member 
states suffered deeper recession; others were not seri u ly affected by the crisis, in 
terms of change in GDP (Figure 1). While the outlook f other economic regions 
(e.g. Japan and the US) looks brighter in early 2014, prospects of the EU-28 are still 
worrying (OECD 2013). While the sovereign default crisis seems to be over in Eu-
rope because of the moderation of sovereign bonds in the peripheral member states 
(Krugman 2014), the capability of resisting future c ises seems unclear even if vast 
efforts have been made to strengthen the economic integration. 
As stated earlier (Végh 2014), several EU-level attempts have been made to 
fight the early effects of the crisis but crisis management mostly remained as a 
member state competence. The reason for this lies in the small size of the common 
budget, which did not let the EU launch sufficient subsidy programs to restore ag-
gregate demand in times of crisis (Wyplosz 2013). Common financial assets like the 
European Stability Mechanism basically could not decrease refinancing costs in the 
Eurozone. Moreover, the common monetary policy in the Eurozone has deprived its 
members of the option of generating inflation and performing currency devaluation 
(Krugman 2012, Dixon 2013) (Figure 2). This puts a different pressure on member 
states. Moreover, many member states have had to perf rm serious austerity 
measures to restore market confidence, especially where an EU-IMF intervention 
was realized. These austerity programs were often compelled and not well-founded 
and were mostly forced in a much criticized, ‘one-size fits for all’ method (Regan 
2013). 
In this paper, our goal is to present critical arguments towards restrictive poli-
cies of the EU member states. We identify and examine indicators to measure their 
volume and compare them with economic performance idicators. To establish a 
connection between the two sets of variables, we use correlation analysis and cluster 
analysis. 
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Figure 1. Change in real GDP at constant prices of EU-27 (percentage, 2007-2013) 





























Source: AMECO Database 
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Figure 2. Net export of goods and services per current GDP of the EU-27 in 2010 





























Source: Ameco Database 
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2. Austerity policies in the EU 
Comparison between economic policies of the EU member states can be trouble-
some. As Corsetti et al. (2012) points out, not only measures at country level, but 
conditions at regional and global levels could also affect macroeconomic results of 
an applied economic policy. What’s more, economic policy measures cannot be ex-
amined without international context as one country’s measures could affect the oth-
er’s economic performance. Nonetheless, we aim to grab the general characteristics 
of economic policy through a statistical analysis. We believe that a general deduc-
tion can be established in respect of austerity policies. However, we know that our 
analysis has its limitations. 
2.1. Necessity of austerity 
Before the Great Recession, the dominant economic framework was based on the 
faith of markets behaving rationally and in a self-correcting way, so market imper-
fections are unlikely. Policy-making emphasized the importance of good macroeco-
nomic governance; the school of saltwater economics dominated economic thinking. 
As Lucas (2003) concluded, the problem of depression-prevention has been perma-
nently solved by modern monetary policy. Unexpectedly, the Great Recession re-
vealed that market failures do occur, that financial m rkets are not necessarily self-
correcting and that investor rationality cannot be aken for granted (Masera 2010). 
In the EU, first reactions to the crisis were underestimating the volume of the 
economic shock. Firstly, the European Commission launched demand-increasing 
and job creating programs, to which member states reacted by applying anti-cyclical 
economic policies (Pelle 2010). However, due to the un xpected economic shock 
and risk avoidance, the costs of the demand-restoring packages had been underesti-
mated. Tax revenues dried up as well so, in 2009, governments had to face the un-
sustainability of public finances. This was accompanied by the continuous augmen-
tation of refinancing costs and rise of country-specific risks. In 2010, Ireland and 
Greece had to request financial help from the International Monetary Fund. 
Austerity can be an effective crisis management tool: if an economy’s refi-
nancing costs decline and a balanced fiscal position can be restored, reimbursement 
of government bonds and their interest can be guaranteed so escape of capital can be 
stopped and investments can rise again. According to the neo-Wicksellian equilibri-
um (Savings[Y] - NX = ∆ Bond_holdings[i - π, ρ]), within the framework of the EU, 
member states’ economies could only be boosted by reducing the riskiness of bonds 
as these economies were in a liquidity trap, making monetary policy ineffective 
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(DeLong–Summers 2012). Member states requesting financ al help from the Troika 
(IMF, EU, ECB) of international lenders1 had to apply subsequent austerity packag-
es (IMF 2011, Seitz–Jost 2012). Policy-makers from well-performing member states 
(e.g. Germany) urged austerity as well (Schäuble 2011). On the other hand, coun-
tries realizing fiscal consolidation took the risk of slow economic growth, persistent 
unemployment and social tension. In spite of the current decrease of refinancing 
costs, some argue that fiscal consolidation has not br ught much success. Some 
blame austerity measures to be the very reason for permanent economic slump. Fur-
thermore, even the IMF has partially shifted emphasis towards the importance of 
fiscal multipliers and stimulation (Plumer 2012, IMF 2012). By 2012 it became clear 
that the high level of indebtedness has no real effect on economic performance 
(Panizza-Presbitero 2012) and the popular Reinhart-Rogoff argument was also 
proved to be wrong (Herndon et al. 2013). 
Recently, the arguments against forced fiscal consolidation have strengthened, 
(Krugman 2012, Stiglitz 2014) as it worsens competitiv ness (Bagaria et al. 2012), 
scrutinizes the so far achieved social standards (Pelle 2013) and, as a natural conse-
quence, creates social resistance among voters. Even if so, for economies with high 
sovereign risk, austerity remains an important tool. The European financial frame-
work in its current form is still rather rigid and the Stability and Growth Pact does 
not leave much space for financial stimulation for indebted member states. 
2.2. Measurement and hypothesis 
Knowing all these arguments, our goal was to find a answer to the following ques-
tions: Is there any correlation between the size of fiscal consolidation and the vol-
ume of economic relapse? Is it possible to make critical remarks the current eco-
nomic framework of the EU, which demands continuous a terity from the member 
states? Has austerity proven harmful for the member states by resulting in several 
years of recession and longer recovery? 
Accordingly, we define our hypothesis: 
H: For the EU member states, the larger the size of austerity, the longer the 
period of recovery from the current recession. 
 
In our statistical analysis, we use data from the AMECO database for the 
2007-2013 period. The basic unit of our analysis is a member state of the EU-27. 
We use data from 2007 as a reference point as it is regarded as the last full year pre-
                                                   
 
1 Ireland, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Cyprus, Latvia, Portugal. 
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ceding the crisis. For describing the current economic situation of member states, we 
chose data from 2013. 
To measure the volume of fiscal consolidation, we have chosen the following 
indicators (reallocation variables): 
- Change of government total expenditure in percentage of GDP: this indicator 
can reveal the increase or decrease of reallocation level within a member 
state; however it can be distorted by the change of GDP as well. 
- Change of government total revenues in percentage of; it can also reveal the 
change of reallocation and also refers to the change of tax increases or de-
creases. 
- Change of current tax burden in the percentage of GDP. 
- Change of social benefits in percentage of GDP. This indicator is connected to 
the first one; it implies that fiscal consolidation is often accompanied by cuts 
in social spending. 
- Change of gross public debt in percentage of GDP. It shows the change in the 
level of indebtedness. Anti-cyclical measures are oft n accompanied by in-
crease of debt levels while austerity programs aim to decrease indebtedness.  
 
To measure economic recovery after the crisis, we defined three indicators 
(recovery variables): 
- Change of unemployment rate: one sign of the end of the crisis in an economy 
is when employment is restored to pre-crisis levels.  
- Change of GDP at constant prices: it refers to the most common concept of 
crisis being over when GDP reaches pre-crisis levels. 
- Gap between actual and potential GDP in 2013. 
3. Data analysis 
Firstly, we introduce descriptive statistics followed by results of our correlation 
analysis. Finally, the cluster analysis is displayed. 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
In our analysis, we examined the EU-27 member states, variables of reallocation 
change were expressed in percentage of GDP. We calculated a difference between 
2013 and 2007, thus the variables show the change in reallocation expressed in per-
centage points. Within the recovery dataset, the unemployment rate also showed the 
difference between 2013 and 2007 in percentage points. The GDP at constant prices 
can be found on AMECO at 2005 market prices; we examined the ratio between 
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2013 and 2007, which is expressed in percentage. Th gap between the actual and 
potential GDP can also be found on AMECO at 2005 market prices; we examined 
the gap in 2013, which is expressed in percentage points (Appendix). 
In the case of reallocation variables, it can be seen that the means cannot be 
typical values for the EU-27 because the standard deviations are high compared to 
the means (Table 1, Appendix). 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics about the variables of reallocation change  
(percentage point) 
Indicator Mean Median 
Std.  
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Expenditure change (2013-2007) 3.79 3.88 3.41 -1.92 10.72 
Revenue change (2013-2007) 0.28 0.90 2.55 -5.05 3.91 
Current tax burden change (2013-2007) -0.50 0.13 2.37 -5.56 3.46 
Social benefits change (2013-2007) 2.46 2.61 1.47 -0.55 5.19 
Gross public debt change (2013-2007) 29.73 23.23 22.82 1.13 99.52 
Source: Own calculation 
 
It can be seen that in expenditure change, the maximum value was 10.72 per-
centage points (Greece). Greece had the maximum value in revenue change (3.91 
percentage points), Luxembourg had the maximum value in current tax burden 
change (3.46 percentage points), Spain had the maximum value in social benefit 
change (5.19 percentage points) and Ireland had the highest value in gross public 
debt change (99.52 percentage points). Half of the countries had at least 23.23 per-
centage points change (median) in gross public debt 
In the case of recovery variables, the standard deviations are also high com-
pared to the means, therefore the means are less informative in the EU-27 (Table 2). 
The maximum value in unemployment rate change was 18.70 percentage 
points (Greece) while the minimum value was a 3.3 percentage points decrease 
(Germany). Only Germany and Malta had a decrease in unemployment rate and half 
of the countries had at least a 3.4 percentage points (median) increase. Regarding 
GDP at constant prices, Poland had a 20 percent increase (from 2007 to 2013) while 
Greece had a 23 percent decrease (from 2007 to 2013). 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics about the variables of recovry 
Indicator Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Unemployment rate change (2013-2007) 
(percentage point) 
4.75 3.40 5.16 -3.30 18.70 
GDP at 2005 market prices change 
(2013/2007) (percentage) 
0.99 0.98 0.08 0.77 1.20 
Gap between actual and potential gross 
domestic product (2013) (percentage 
point) 
-2.81 -2.35 2.62 -12.80 1.24 
Source: Own calculation 
3.2. Correlation analysis of the reallocation change and recovery 
Our research focuses on the relationship between the change of reallocation and re-
covery from crisis, which can be examined by correlation analysis. Some of the var-
iables (revenue change, gross public debt change, unemployment rate change and 
gap between actual and potential GDP) do not have a normal distribution (p-value of 
Shapiro-Wilk statistics for each variable is <0.05), therefore Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients were calculated. According to the correlation coefficients (Table 3), we 
can describe the relationships between each reallocation change and recovery varia-
bles. 





GDP at constant 
prices change 
(2013/2007) 
Gap between actual 
and potential gross 
domestic product 
(2013) 
Expenditure change (2013-2007) 0.312 -0.543 -0.430 
Revenue change (2013-2007) -0.146 -0.250 -0.130 
Current tax burden change (2013-
2007) 
-0.319 -0.063 -0.069 
Social benefits change (2013-
2007) 
0.631 -0.698 -0.454 
Gross public debt change (2013-
2007) 
0.617 -0.700 -0.447 
Source: Own calculation 
 
In the case of expenditure change and unemployment, the coefficient 
(rs=0.312) shows a weak relationship with a positive dir ction but in the case of 
GDP at constant prices change and gap between actual nd potential GDP, there are 
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moderate relationships with negative directions (rs=-0.543, rs=-0.430). This implies 
that countries with higher expenditure changes have low r changes in GDP at con-
stant prices (and vice versa).2 In the line of revenue change and current tax burden 
change, the correlation coefficients show only weak relationships. 
The social benefits change has a stronger than moderate relationship with a 
positive direction in relation to the unemployment rate change (rs=0.631). It implies 
that countries with higher social benefits changes have higher unemployment rate 
changes so increasing social benefits do not cause decreasing unemployment 
change. The social benefits change has a stronger than moderate relationship with a 
negative direction in relation to the GDP at constat prices change (rs=-0.698). It re-
fers to the fact that countries with higher social benefits changes have lower GDP at 
constant price changes so increasing social benefits cause decreasing GDP at con-
stant price change. The social benefits change has a moderate relationship with a 
negative direction in relation to the gap between actu l and potential GDP  
(rs=-0.454). It means that countries with higher social benefits changes have lower 
gaps between actual and potential GDP. 
The gross public debt change has a stronger than moderate relationship with a 
positive direction in relation to the unemployment rate change (rs=0.617). It shows 
that countries with higher gross public debt changes have higher unemployment 
changes so increasing gross public debt does not cause decreasing unemployment 
change. The gross public debt change has a strong relationship with a negative direc-
tion in relation to the GDP at constant prices change (rs=-0.700). It refers to the fact 
that countries with higher gross public debt changes have lower GDP at constant 
prices changes so increasing higher public debts cau e decreasing GDP at constant 
prices change. The gross public debt change has a moderate relationship with a neg-
ative direction in relation to the gap between actul and potential GDP (rs=-0,447). It 
means that countries with higher gross public debt changes have lower gaps between 
actual and potential GDP. 
Based on the relationships, we can be conclude that some of the variables (so-
cial benefits change, gross public debt change) support our hypothesis according to 
which greater reallocation change does not lead to more favorable changes in recov-
ery. However, the rest of the reallocation change variables (expenditure change, rev-
enue change, current tax burden change) did not support our assumption clearly, 
which suggests that further analysis is necessary. As it was mentioned in the descrip-
tive statistics part, the standard deviations of the indicators were quite high, which 
                                                   
 
2 For correlation coefficients, causality can be intrpreted from the point of view of both variables. 
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suggests that more homogenous groups of the countries should be created by cluster 
analysis. 
3.3. Cluster analysis based on the reallocation change variables 
The core idea of our study is to examine the effect of changes in reallocation on 
changes in recovery. We applied a hierarchical clustering (Ward’s method, Euclide-
an distance).3 The number of clusters can be determined based on the increase in 
squared Euclidean distance (Sajtos–Mitev 2007), which suggested a 4-cluster solu-
tion. We also examined the 3- and 5-cluster solutions but the interpretability was 
better in the 4-cluster solution. The clusters can be interpreted by the means of clus-
tering variables (changes in recovery variables). A mean can be a typical feature in a 
group if the group’s standard deviation is lower than the total (EU-27) standard de-
viation (Kovács et al. 2006). This criterion was fulfilled in the majority of the cells; 
there is only one high value in the fourth group, for gross public debt change. 
There are nine member states (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, France, Luxem-
bourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, United Kingdom) in the first cluster where all of 
the means of reallocation change variables were higher than the mean in EU-27, thus 
higher changes in reallocation variables can be in this group (see Table 4). 
In the second group, six countries can be found (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Sweden) where the expenditures, revenu s and current tax bur-
dens decreased. The social benefits change was positive but lower than the EU-27 
mean and the gross public debt change was lower than the EU-27 mean. This group 
can show lower changes in reallocation than other groups or the EU-27 means. 
There are nine countries (Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Hungary, 
Malta, Netherlands, Austria and Slovakia) in the third cluster. All of the means of 
reallocation change variables were positive but only the mean of revenue change and 
the mean of current tax burden change were higher than he means in EU-27. This 
cluster is similar to the first one but shows more moderate changes in reallocation 
variables than the first group. 
The fourth group contains three countries (Ireland, Spain, Cyprus) where 
there was a higher increase in expenditures, a higher decrease in revenues and a 
higher decrease in current tax burden than the EU-27 value. The highest social bene-
fit and gross public debt changes can be seen in this group among the clusters, caus-
ing a high standard deviation. It can be questioned why Greece does not belong to 
this group as, similarly to these countries, Greece also has a quite high gross public 
debt change (Appendix). The explanation can be found in revenue changes. While 
                                                   
 
3 For our analysis, we used SPSS 22.0 statistical program. 
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Ireland, Spain and Cyprus had a decrease in revenues, Gr ece had an increase simi-
lar to the other countries in the first cluster. 

























2.49 1.18 1.19 0.66 19.80 




1.37 1.50 1.24 0.98 13.16 




1.66 0.67 1.01 1.32 8.23 




0.77 1.53 1.60 0.64 24.06 
Total  
(EU-27) 




3.41 2.55 2.37 1.47 22.82 
Source: Own calculation 
 
After the description of the clusters based on changes in reallocation, the 
changes in recovery in each group can be examined. I  the first cluster, all of the 
countries had increasing unemployment rates, however, th  mean (5.09 percentage 
points) is not a typical value due to the high value of standard deviations (Table 5, 
Appendix). The change in GDP at constant prices show  also a mixed picture be-
cause Greece had a 23 percent decrease, which pulled down the mean of this group. 
As regards the gap between actual and potential GDP, the standard deviation is also 
higher than the EU-27 value, thus a typical feature cannot be drawn based on this 
variable. This group showed the highest changes in reallocation variables, however, 
only a mixed picture can be drawn about the changes in recovery indicators. 
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Table 5. Change in recovery in the clusters 
Cluster 
Unemployment 
rate change  
(2013-2007)  
(percentage point) 




Gap between actual 





Mean 5.09 0.95 -4.10 
Std. Deviation 5.67 0.08 3.42 
2 (n=6) 
Mean 3.85 1.04 -1.29 
Std. Deviation 2.92 0.09 1.09 
3 (n=9) 
Mean 2.18 1.01 -2.14 
Std. Deviation 2.81 0.06 1.88 
4 (n=3) 
Mean 13.23 0.93 -3.98 
Std. Deviation 4.86 0.01 2.65 
Total  
(EU-27) 
Mean 4.75 0.99 -2.81 
Std. Deviation 5.16 0.08 2.62 
Source: Own calculation 
 
The second cluster has lower standard deviations (compared to the EU-27 
values); therefore the means describe this group well. The change in unemployment 
rate was lower, the change in GDP at constant prices was higher, and the gap be-
tween the actual and potential GDP is lower than the EU-27 value. This group had 
the lowest changes in reallocation but the highest values in recovery. The third clus-
ter has also lower standard deviations (compared to the EU-27 values) and the 
means show a better picture in changes in recovery than the EU-27 values. This 
group had moderate changes in reallocation variables. 
In the fourth cluster, change in unemployment rate was higher and change in 
GDP at constant prices was lower than the EU-27 values. The change in gap be-
tween actual and potential GDP also shows a less favorable picture than that of the 
EU-27, however, there are differences in this indicator among the three countries. 
This group had the highest change in expenditure, social benefits and gross public 
debt change as well but the change in recovery variables cannot yet describe a pros-
perous situation. 
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These results show that the changes in reallocation or the increase of realloca-
tion do not clearly affect positive changes in recovery. Moreover, some of the corre-
lation coefficients and the results of the cluster analysis highlight that decreasing re-
allocation can be coupled with more favorable changes in recovery, which supports 
our hypothesis. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, our goal was to examine austerity policies applied in the EU member 
states during the years of the Great Recession. We presented the theoretical frame-
work for fiscal consolidation, and also presented various related economic views. 
Our hypothesis was that the larger the size of austerity, the longer the period of re-
covery from the current recession. We used descriptive s atistics and cluster analysis 
to approach this question. Of the most important results of the analysis we highlight 
that greater positive change in reallocation does not help economic recovery, which 
more social spending does not help fight unemployment, and that gross public debt 
change has a strong negative correlation with GDP at constant prices. 
With our results, we regard our hypothesis as confirmed, namely that larger 
austerity is not accompanied by quicker recovery. However, with our current statis-
tical assets, causality cannot be defined: we cannot claim that recovery is slow as a 
consequence of austerity, or austerity had to be applied because of economic slump 
and slow recovery. We plan to develop our model further in order to find statistical 
evidence concerning causality. We could overcome a s rious limitation of the analy-
sis by using data in proportion of potential GDP instead of real GDP because, by us-
ing the second one, the results are distorted by economic relapse. 
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Austria  3,47 1,99 1,95 1,61 14,61 0,70 1,03 -1,04 
Belgium  5,85 3,06 1,77 2,67 16,41 1,10 1,02 -1,71 
Bulgaria  -1,69 -4,81 -5,13 2,64 2,22 6,00 1,04 -1,68 
Cyprus  6,73 -5,05 -5,56 4,30 57,24 12,80 0,92 -5,84 
Czech 
Republic  
2,29 0,15 -0,49 1,64 21,10 1,80 1,01 -3,39 
Denmark  7,39 0,70 0,63 2,98 17,14 3,50 0,96 -4,71 
Estonia  4,61 1,86 0,71 2,38 6,30 4,70 0,97 1,24 
Finland  10,48 2,52 1,78 4,45 23,23 1,30 0,96 -2,71 
France  4,47 3,07 2,80 2,61 29,28 2,60 1,01 -2,89 
Germany  1,17 0,90 0,28 -0,55 14,34 -3,30 1,04 -0,96 
Greece  10,72 3,91 1,72 3,77 68,90 18,70 0,77 -12,80 
Hungary  -0,35 1,65 -1,55 -0,20 13,68 3,60 0,96 -3,48 
Ireland  5,35 -2,01 -2,46 3,95 99,52 8,60 0,93 -0,95 
Italy  3,33 2,07 1,25 3,56 29,71 6,10 0,91 -4,46 
Latvia  0,22 -0,80 -3,04 2,35 33,41 5,20 0,91 0,20 
Lithuania  0,26 -1,76 -2,94 2,07 23,09 7,90 1,01 -0,04 
Luxem-
bourg  
7,77 3,22 3,46 3,07 17,84 1,50 1,00 -2,16 
Malta  2,69 1,56 0,16 0,55 11,88 -0,10 1,09 -0,48 
Nether-
lands  
4,89 1,45 0,83 2,39 29,55 3,40 0,98 -3,35 
Poland  -0,66 -3,62 -3,35 0,43 13,20 1,10 1,20 -2,09 
Portugal  4,77 2,07 0,85 4,18 59,44 8,50 0,93 -4,59 
Romania  -1,92 -1,46 -1,25 1,72 25,74 0,90 1,04 -1,77 
Slovakia  1,80 0,58 0,10 1,85 24,73 2,70 1,11 -3,33 
Slovenia  7,78 2,08 0,13 3,50 40,08 6,20 0,92 -3,14 
Spain  5,43 -3,32 -3,36 5,19 58,47 18,30 0,94 -5,16 
Sweden  1,73 -2,93 -2,77 0,35 1,13 2,00 1,06 -2,35 
United 
Kingdom  
3,88 0,36 -0,12 2,95 50,55 2,40 0,98 -2,23 
 
